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SECTION 1981 LIABILITY FOR RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY SECTARIAN SCHOOLS
Federal public policy, grounded in the United States Constitution,
clearly condemns racial discrimination in public and private education.'
The government's interest in eliminating all discrimination and segrega-
tion,' even in sectarian3 schools, conflicts, however, with the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment to the Constitution,
which expressly guarantees freedom of religion." Since the government
must maintain a neutral attitude toward all religions,5 courts must con-
front the difficult issue whether the first amendment exempts sectarian
' Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980), cert granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-3).
Statutes and judicial decisions, as well as community attitudes, reflect the widespread
public policy against racial discrimination in education. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (national policy moving constantly in direction
of eliminating racial segregation in all sectors of society); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150, 1167 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (racial discrimination in
education contrary to federal public policy); MODEL ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT, §§ 501-02,
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1966 Handbook) (prohibiting discriminatory admis-
sions policies in any private educational institution). Federal courts have interpreted the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to require a strong government commitment to
racial equality, particularly in elementary and secondary education. See Note, The Judicial
Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. REV.
378, 396 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Private Schools]. Courts have barred direct government
assistance to discriminatory private schools. Id.; see Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,
466-67 (1973) (government textbook aid program to segregated private schools violative of
equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment). The Supreme Court has never found,
however, that granting charitable tax exemptions to racially discriminatory institutions un-
constitutionally implicates the government in racial discrimination. Private Schools, supra,
at 396. Tax benefits are at least economically sufficiently similar to direct government ex-
penditures to warrant constitutional scrutiny. Id.
' Federal constitutional as well as statutory provisions seeking to obviate discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin reflect the United States' commit-
ment to equal opportunity. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 2000a (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on public ac-
commodations), 2000c (Title IV of the Act, on public education), 2000e (Title VH of the Act,
on equal employment opportunities) (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
3 Courts generally have not discussed the distinctions between secular and sectarian
schools. One court has defined a "secular" school simply as a school that is not religious or
spiritual. State v. Smith, 19 Okla. Crim. 184, -, 198 P. 879, 881 (1921). Another court has
described a "sectarian" school as having affiliation with a particular religious sect or
denomination, or coming under the control or governing influence of such sect or denomina-
tion. Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, -, 267 N.W. 127, 128 (1936).
' The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 667-72 (1970).
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schools from antidiscrimination laws. No court, however, has resolved
the issue.
To attack racially discriminatory sectarian schools under the civil
rights laws, private plaintiffs usually bring an action under section 1981
of Title 42 of the United States Code (section 1981).' Congress enacted
section 1981 pursuant to the thirteenth amendment,' which gives Con-
gress authority to prohibit racially discriminatory acts of private indi-
viduals.' Section 1981 grants to all persons the equal right to make con-
tracts within the jurisdiction of the United States.' Case law has not pro-
The first amendment requires the government to maintain neutral relations with
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18
(1947), by neither sponsoring nor interfering with religious practices. 397 U.S. at 669. The
Supreme Court has characterized its role as "benevolent neutrality." Id.
Government neutrality toward religious organizations appears in many areas of the
law. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 164 exempts religious institutions
from its equal employment mandates. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-1 (1976). Examples of government
neutrality toward religion are present also in the areas of national defense, 50 U.S.C. §§
456(g) & (j) (1976) (exemption from selective service for ministers and conscientious objec-
tors) and labor law, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979) (exemption from
coverage by federal labor laws for church-related schools). Furthermore, tax laws include
special provisions minimizing contact between church and state. See generally Whelan,
"Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
885 (1977); Note, The Internal Revenue Service as a Monitor of Church Institutions: The
Excessive Entanglement Problem, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 929 (1977).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every
kind and to no other.
' See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-40 (1968); 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION § 88.00 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. For nearly 100 years after
§ 1981's enactment in 1866, courts erroneously believed that Congress enacted § 1981 pur-
suant to the fourteenth amendment. See LARSON, supra, § 88.00; note 8 infra. In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court held that Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment. 392 U.S. at 437-38. Sections 1981 and 1982 are
traceable to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, c.31, § 1, 14 stat. 27. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973); see Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30-31 n.7 (1948).
Consequently, the Supreme Court has seen no reason to construe these sections in-
dependently of one another in view of their historical interrelationship. 410 U.S. at 440. See
generally LARSON, supra, § 88.00.
8 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 23
(1883); United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 324 (E.D. Ark. 1903). The thirteenth amendment
provides in relevant part:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within
the United States....
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
By comparison, the fourteenth amendment requires state or government action. 109 U.S. at
23.
9 See note 6 supra; note 38 infra.
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vided racially discriminatory sectarian schools with firm guidance for
avoiding section 1981 liability. In Runyon v. McCrary,10 the Supreme
Court first balanced section 1981 against individual constitutional
rights.1' The Runyon Court applied section 1981 to contracts that pro-
vided "educational services"" and ruled that the statute prohibited
racially discriminatory private school admissions policies.'$ The Court
left open the issue of whether section 1981 prohibited sectarian schools
from discriminating on the basis of religion." To the extent that the
Supreme Court has applied section 1981 to private secular schools, 5
however, a court should be able to apply section 1981 to any private
school, whether sectarian or secular, practicing racial discrimination. On-
ly a constitutional defense should bar application of section 1981 to all
private schools.'"
Applying section 1981 to sectarian schools raises the issue of first
amendment protection. 17 A school claiming a first amendment defense to
racial discrimination must base any racial exclusions on religious
grounds alone, rather than mere administrative policy. 8 Before granting
first amendment protection to a racially discriminatory sectarian school,
a court must determine whether the school bases its practices on religi-
ous beliefs or mere personal codes of conduct. 9 In addition, a court must
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
" See Note, A Sectarian School Asserts Its Religious Beliefs: Have the Courts Nar-
rowed the Constitutional Right to Free Exercise of Religion?, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 709, 719
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Free Exercise]. The Runyon decision reflects the Supreme
Court's finding of a compelling government interest in enforcing § 1981. Id.
1 427 U.S. at 172.
, Id. at 172-73. Viewing private sector racial discrimination as a vestige of slavery, the
Runyon Court considered racial discrimination within the reach of Congress under the
enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 170. The Court viewed private school at-
tendince as a contractual undertaking within the protections of § 1981. Id. at 172-73.
" See Note, Freedom of Religion as a Defense to a § 1981 Action Against a Racially
Discriminatory Private School, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 107, 110 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Defense].
5 See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
"8 See text accompanying notes 17-22 infra.
" See Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144, 1150 (4th Cir. 1980); Brown
v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063
(1978).
" See text accompanying notes 26-29, 42 & 48-52 infra; Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp.
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejection of first amend-
ment free exercise defense for discharging white female employee who socialized with black
male because church failed to base employee's discharge on church doctrinal policy).
" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). In Yoder, the Court had to
determine whether members of the Amish religion, whose religious faith pervaded their
mode of life, based their refusal to attend high school on truly religious beliefs or merely
personal beliefs. Id. The Court decided that the belief was religious. Id at 216. Factors in-
fluencing the Court included the beliefs origin in literal interpretations of the Bible, the
long, consistent practice of the belief over hundreds of years despite the progression of the
rest of the world, and the fact that an organized group shared the belief. Id. at 216-18,
234-36.
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determine whether the school practitioners sincerely hold those beliefs.'
While a court may not judge the truth or falsity of a belief,21 a court may
evaluate the belief's religious significance to the practitioner.'
The Fifth Circuit directly confronted the issue of section 1981 ap-
plicability to a sectarian school raising a first amendment defense in
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc.' When Dade Christian, a private
sectarian school affiliated with the New Testament Baptist Church,
refused to admit two black students on the basis of race, the two
students and their parents filed suit under section 1981.24 The school
raised the defense that the free exercise clause of the first amendment
sanctioned its members' religious belief that socialization of the races
would lead to interracial marriages and that interracial marriages are
evil." The trial court in Dade Christian found that section 1981 pro-
hibited the school's discriminatory conduct." In affirming the trial
court's resolution in favor of the plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit agreed that
the school's discriminatory policy was social rather than religious.' Find-
ing no clear religious policy of segregation in Dade Christian, the plurality
thus eliminated the first amendment issue by rejecting the first amend-
ment defense.' The plurality insisted that a religious organization must
maintain a clearly defined institutional policy before the organization's
Courts have identified specific characteristics that will not raise a belief to a level suf-
ficient to warrant first amendment protection. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 109-10 (1943) (practitioners' zeal will not determine "religiousness" of conduct); United
States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (D.D.C. 1968) (mere religious nomenclature insuffi-
cient to warrant first amendment protection).
See note 19 supra.
" See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1944).
" Whether a practitioner sincerely holds his beliefs is a question of fact, see Maguire
v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D. Conn. 1975), with the burden of proof on the party
asserting the belief. See Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307, 309-10 (10th Cir. 1973). Although
assessing the sincerity of religious beliefs poses subjective problems, courts have suggested
guidelines that eliminate some subjective elements of the inquiry. For example, inconsistent
statements and actions may cast doubt on the sincerity of a religious claim. See Witmer v.
United States, 348 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1955) (conviction of Jehovah's Witness for failure to sub-
mit to induction after first disclaiming ministerial exemption then asserting that he was
minister because exemption as farmer denied). Courts also will consider the social, mental,
or physical costs that a practitioner is willing to bear to maintain a religious belief influen-
tial. See In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, -, 125 N.W.2d 588, 590 (1963) (claimant preferred
to go to jail rather than compromise religious belief precluding her from serving on jury).
= 556 F.2d 310, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
24 Id. at 311.
22 Id.
Id. at 311-12.
Id at 311, 314.
Id. at 313-14. The Dade Christian plurality concluded that Dade Christian's racial ex-
clusion was based on policy rather than religious beliefs. Id. at 312-13. The plurality noted
that the evidence amply supported the lower court's conclusion that Dade Christian's beliefs
were nothing more than recent policy responding to the growing issue of segregation and
integration. Id. at 313.
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belief can receive free exercise clause protection.9 Consequently,
neither court reached the conflict between section 1981 and the first
amendment.
The Fourth Circuit recently adopted the Fifth Circuit's Dade Chris-
tian analysis regarding application of section 1981 to racially
discriminatory sectarian schools." In Fiedler v. Marumsco Baptist
Church," the Fourth Circuit reversed one of the first federal court deci-
sions to uphold a sectarian school's racial discrimination policy on the
sole basis of alleged religious beliefs.2 Marumsco Christian School, af-
filiated with Marumsco Baptist Church (collectively Marumsco), was a
private school admitting students without regard to race since its found-
ing in 1972.1 Although the school encouraged interracial harmony, Aleck
Lee Bledsoe, school principal and church pastor, opposed interracial
romantic relationships on the basis of religious convictions., Neither the
school's enrollment contract nor the church's constitution and bylaws,
however, expressly prohibited or even alluded to interracial dating."
Bledsoe expelled Fiedler, a female student, because he considered her to
be in a romantic association with a black student." Fiedler and her
father then brought suit against Bledsoe and Marumsco claiming that
the expulsion' violated her section 1981 right to contract free from
racial discrimination.' In rejecting the Fiedlers' claim, the district court
held that the free exercise clause of the first amendment provided
Marumsco and Bledsoe with a valid defense to the section 1981 claim.
' I& at 314.
See Fiedler v. Marumsco Baptist Church, 631 F.2d 1144, 1152 (4th Cir. 1980); text ac-
companying notes 27-29 supra.
3, 631 F.2d 1144.
Id at 1147-48, 1154.
, Id. at 1147.
Id at 114647. Bledsoe claimed to base his strong opposition to interracial romantic
relationships on religious beliefs derived from the Bible and on the conviction that such rela-
tionships pose social problems. Id. at 1147.
5 Id.
S1d.
, The Fiedlers' appeal in Marumsco actually involved Mr. Fiedler and both of his
daughters, all three of whom challenged the district court's dismissal of their § 1981 civil
rights suit. Id. at 1146. Only the older daughter, however, was expelled for an alleged
romantic association with a black in violation of Bledsoe's religious beliefs. I& at 1147. The
school expelled the younger daughter after Mr. Fiedler contacted the NAACP regarding
the first child's expulsion and decided to proceed with legal action against Bledsoe and
Marumsco. Id.
' Id. at 1146. The Fourth Circuit noted as a preliminary matter that the Fiedlers,
though white, had standing to sue under § 1981. Id at 1149. The statute applies to all per-
sons as well as to contracts for educational services. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976) (section 1981 affords remedy to white men who suf-
fered racial discrimination in contractual relationship with private employer); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (section 1981 applies to educational contracts).
1 631 F.2d at 1146.
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The district court predicated its dismissal of the Fiedlers' section 1981
claim on the determination that Marumsco had maintained a bona fide
religious belief that the Bible forbids interracial romance, dating, and
marriage. 0 Absent a finding of compelling government interest, there-
fore, the first amendment insulated Marumsco's religious beliefs from at-
tack.41 In reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit found that the
Fiedlers had a valid section 1981 claim.42 Furthermore, the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the district court was clearly erroneous in holding that
Marumsco's religious beliefs prohibiting interracial relationships were
bona fide and, therefore, constitutionally protected.43
Since Runyon v. McCrary established that section 1981 applies to
private secular schools,4 the issue left open for the Fourth Circuit to
consider in Marumsco was whether section 1981 prohibited a commer-
cial, private, sectarian school from terminating a student's school con-
tract for racially discriminatory reasons."5 Distinguishing Runyon, the
Fourth Circuit noted that Marumsco's sectarian nature was significant
only in giving rise to a constitutional defense to the Fiedlers' section
1981 claim." Consequently, the Marumsco court held that a sectarian
school can be liable under section 1981 unless the school has a bona fide
constitutional defense.47
In adopting the Dade Christian free exercise analysis, 8 the Fourth
Circuit found that the district court failed to distinguish between Bled-
" Id. at 1148.
41 Id.; see text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
42 Id at 1149-50.
Id. at 1149. The Fourth Circuit noted that the threshold issue in assessing the validity
of a free exercise defense is whether the belief in question is bona fide. Id. at 1151. If the
belief is not bona fide, then a court need not determine whether the law as applied is un-
constitutional. Id. The Supreme Court has set guidelines for determining whether a belief is
religious. Id.; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-19 (1972); text accompanying notes
17-22 supra. The first amendment does not afford constitutional protection for a belief
representing personal philosophy and preference rather than deep religious conviction
shared by an organized group. 406 U.S. at 216; 631 F.2d at 1151. To distinguish matters of
personal preference from deep religious conviction the Fourth Circuit cited Sequoyah v.
TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) and Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977). 631 F.2d at 1151-52. In Sequoyah, Cherokee Indians claimed that flooding
sacred ground infringed on their right to worship. 620 F.2d at 1160. The Sixth Circuit noted,
however, that the Indians failed to establish that the land was central or indispensable to
Cherokee religious observances. Id at 1164. Instead, the Indians demonstrated personal
preference based on historical and cultural grounds rather than the organized group's
shared religious convictions. Id. In Dade Christian, the sectarian school's discrimination
resulted from social policy rather than the exercise of religion. 556 F.2d at 312; see note 28
supra.
" See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
'5631 F.2d at 1149.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1149-50.
Id at 1152; see text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
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soe's personal beliefs and those of Marumsco.4 9 None of the writings em-
bodying the church's religious tenets addressed the subject of interra-
cial relationships. 0 The appellate court held that the district court erro-
neously imputed Bledsoe's private views on racial purity to the Church.'
Consequently, Marumsco's failure to raise a bona fide religious belief
resulted in its failure to establish a first amendment defense."
Even if a sectarian school justifies its racially exclusionary practices
on the basis of religious beliefs, the first amendment defense may fail to
thwart application of section 1981. Although the Constitution forbids
government regulation of religious beliefs,53 the promotion of public
health, safety, and general welfare may require regulation even of
religiously motivated activity.54 Courts have adopted a balancing test to
determine when the government may interfere with religious activity.
5
Courts weigh the compelling government interest in burdening a reli-
631 F.2d at 1152.
Id at 1152-53. The Fourth Circuit noted that the institutional belief of Marumsco
was one of racial equality. Id. at 1153. Bledsoe's own testimony provided the only indication
that Marumsco shared his opposition to interracial romantic relationships. Id No church
writing addressed the subject of interracial romantic relationships, nor did the writings
even mention race relations. Id. at 1152-53. Furthermore, evidence showed that prior to the
Fiedlers' expulsions, Marumsco never considered an alleged doctrinal opposition to inter-
racial romantic relationships. I& at 1153.
11 Id at 1152.
52 Id. at 1153-54.
'3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
5 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
The Supreme Court's consideration of the legislative power to control religious ac-
tivity began as early as 1878. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878) (con-
flict between statute outlawing polygamy and Morman beliefs). Through subsequent deci-
sions, primarily involving conscientious objectors and schools, the Court has developed a
balancing test to resolve the conflict. Conscientious objectors caused the Court to weigh the
first amendment right to free exercise against the power of Congress to raise an army. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 & amend. I; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-49
(1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970). See also Witmer v. United States,
348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955). With schools, the Court faced the conflict between the right to free
exercise and the interest of the states in education. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
214-15, 219-20 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
Legislation has conflicted with other constitutional rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973) (right of privacy outweighed Texas interests in protecting health and
life); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66 (1958) (members' right of freedom of associa-
tion outweighed Alabama interests in protecting its citizens); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399-403 (1923) (right of due process outweighed Nebraska interests in educational pro-
cess).
Courts do not always employ a balancing test, however. At least one court has taken
the approach that a compelling state interest justifies any burden resulting from the ap-
plication of the statute. See United States v. Campbell, 439 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 1971)
(without balancing, court found that preserving armed forces' discipline and morale justified
infringement on Jehovah's Witness' claim that being compelled to submit to civilian work in
lieu of army induction violated his first amendment rights).
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gious activity against resulting infringement on the school's sincere
religious beliefs. 8 The outcome of the "balancing" is unpredictable,
however, in view of varying fact situations that courts encounter.
The government has the burden of demonstrating compelling state
interest for interfering with religious activity. 7 The government's in-
terest is strong, for example, when the necessity for application of a
statute is great 8 or when granting a broad religious exemption would
render enforcement of a particular provision impossible.59 The govern-
ment also must demonstrate that application of the statute to the
religious activity in question will enhance the purpose of the statute."'
Furthermore, the government must show that no less restrictive means
for accomplishing the same purpose are available. 1 In weighing govern-
mental interests in regulating religious activity, courts look for substan-
tial threats to public safety, peace, or order.82
Courts have failed to establish, when, if ever, a religious school's
first amendment defense will defeat a racial discrimination claim under
See text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
'7 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406-09 (1963).
" See Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 30 Md. App. 317, -, 352 A.2d 334, 341-42 (1976)
(government's valid interest in determining cause of death outweighed claimant's sincere
religious belief against autopsy).
"' See Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
395 U.S. 6 (1969). The Leary court relied on the government's compelling interest in limiting
broad religious exemptions to distinguish People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). 383 F.2d at 861. In Woody the court established a narrow exemption
from the state marijuana laws for Navajo Indians using peyote in religious ceremonies. 61
Cal. 2d at - , 394 P.2d at 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The Leary court refused, however,
to permit a similar religious exemption because the claimant's drug use was not central to
the ceremony or practice of an organized religious group. 383 F.2d at 861.
' See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26 (Amish demonstrated that alternative
mode of education served same interests as government's compelling interest in compulsory
education); American Friends Serv. Comm. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 1176, 1183-84
(E.D. Pa. 1973), modified, 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (additional cost of collection incurred by granting
exception to withholding tax statute for Quaker claimants did not burden government's in-
terest in maintaining orderly, efficient system of income tax collection).
See Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. at 153, 155-60 (S.D. Iowa 1974), affd sub nom.
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975). In Teterud, the court refused to uphold a
prison hair length regulation that infringed on a prisoner's sincere religious beliefs when
less restrictive means were available for accomplishing the state's interests. 385 F. Supp. at
155-56. Alternatives to the state's assertions included retaking prisoner's picture to avoid
identification problems, doing a hair search along with routine body search to prevent hid-
den contraband, and requiring prisoners to wear hairnets to maintain sanitation in kitchens
and safety around machinery. Id. at 158-60.
" See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). In Sherbert the Court found no
compelling state interest to deny unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day Aventist
who refused to work on Saturdays as a consequence of her religious beliefs. Id. at 406-09.
The Court specifically suggested, however, that it would reach a different result if the
employee's religious beliefs had made her a nonproductive member of society, implying that
such conduct might disrupt public peace and order. Id. at 410.
SECTION 1981
section 1981. The Dade Christian concurring and dissenting opinions
provide some guidance on this point." The finding in both opinions that
Dade Christian's segregation policy constituted a religious practice
enabled discussion of the balancing issue." After acknowledging the
necessity of a balancing test, the dissent would have remanded the
"balancing" to the district court. 5 The concurrence, however, balanced
Dade Christian's free exercise defense against the government's interest
in prohibiting discrimination."6 Factors leading the concurring opinion to
conclude that the government's interest should prevail over the first
amendment defense included the minor role of the segregation policy in
Dade Christian's continued existence," the government's compelling in-
terest in enforcing the thirteenth amendment," and the decision's deter-
rent effect on schools seeking to avoid Runyon desegregation re-
quirements. 9 The pivotal considerations guiding the balancing test ap-
pear to be the importance of the challenged practice to the religious
organization and the government's purpose in attacking the challenged
action.
Two intense convictions motivated Judge Goldberg to write his
concurring opinion in Dade Christian.71 Judge Goldberg noted first that a
court should not denigrate even imperfectly expressed religious con-
cepts into non-religion.71 Rather, a court must define "religion" broadly,
then consider a first amendment defense on the merits. 2 Although the
concurrence found Dade Christian's beliefs to be clearly "religious," the
religious practices were destructive of the thirteenth amendment's
undergirding principles. 3 Consequently, Judge Goldberg stated his se-
cond conviction that the rights of blacks to participate in society on
equal terms must prevail over a religious practice that the practitioner
See 556 F.2d at 314-24 (Goldberg, J., concurring) & 324-26 (Roney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 314-15 (Goldberg, J., concurring) & 324-26 (Roney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 326 (Roney, J., dissenting). Judge Roney noted that established law required a
balancing of § 1981 and Dade Christian's free exercise of religion. Id. The dissent declined to
consider the balancing, however, because of insufficient findings by the district court. Id.
Id. at 314-15 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Judge Goldberg noted that the compelling
governmental interest in guaranteeing the rights of blacks freely to contract with private
schools, thus eliminating a badge of slavery, outweighed Dade Christian's free exercise
claim. Id. at 314. Although Dade Christian's beliefs were religious, the concurrence con-
sidered the school's religious practices destructive of the undergirding principles of the thir-
teenth amendment. Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 323.
CO Id. at 324; see text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
556 F.2d at 315 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
71 yd.
Id. at 317. Judge Goldberg noted that one person's heresy can be another person's
religion. Id. Consequently, Judge Goldberg cautioned courts to define religion so that label-
ing does not become the touchstone of constitutional analysis. Id.
1 Id. at 314-15.
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can subordinate without hindering the religion's viability.74 In finding
the government's interests more compelling than Dade Christian's, the
concurrence noted the importance of delineating the appropriate scope
of the government's interests in eradicating the badges and incidents of
slavery through universal enforcement of section 1981. 71 The govern-
ment's interest draws strength not only from the congressional judg-
ment reflected in section 1981 but also from the Constitution by way of
the thirteenth amendment's proscription against slavery and involun-
tary servitude.76 The concurrence concluded that a first amendment
claim perhaps has never faced a more compelling governmental
interest," and that the religious practices must yield to the constitu-
tional imperative to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery
through enforcement of section 1981.78
The Fourth Circuit provided further guidance for evaluating the sec-
tion 1981 liability of racially discriminatory sectarian schools in Bob
Jones University v. United States. 9 The primary issue confronting the
Fourth Circuit in Bob Jones was whether the denial by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) of tax exempt status to a racially discriminatory
sectarian school contravened the first amendment."0 The Fourth Circuit
"' Id. at 315. Judge Goldberg noted that courts cannot question the veracity of sincerely
held religious beliefs. Id. at 321. When the basis of a first amendment defense constitutes a
"very minor" religious practice, however, overriding that defense would not endanger the
church's survival. Id. at 321-22. Dade Christian, for example, did not advance religious op-
position to basic racial integration. Id. at 322. Rather, Dade Christian's grievance extended
only to interracial "socialization" that might encourage interracial marriage. Id. Judge
Goldberg also stressed that no one purported to use § 1981 to impose interracial marriage
on anyone. Id. Parental supervision of children's upbringing and education remained intact.
Id. Furthermore, the Constitution has never guaranteed that parents can exist in an urban
environment and simultaneously exclude every possibility that children will hear and adopt
ideas converse to those of the parents. Id.
7 Id. at 323. Judge Goldberg stressed the need to avoid viewing Dade Christian's





7' 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 278 (U.S. Oct. 13,
1981) (No. 81-3). Bob Jones involved a religious university. The Internal Revenue Service
revoked the university's tax exempt status when the Service found that university policies
forbidding interracial dating constituted racial discrimination. Id. at 149-50.
' Id. at 150. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) extends tax exempt status to organiza-
tions organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The Code also allows charitable deductions for contributions to
such tax exempt organizations. Id. § 170(c)(2)(B).
In determining whether application of the government's nondiscrimination policy to
Bob Jones University violated the first amendment, the Fourth Circuit considered both the
free exercise and establishment clauses. 693 F.2d at 153-55; see text accompanying notes
81-88 infra (discussion of Fourth Circuit's treatment of free exercise clause). The govern-
ment's nondiscrimination policy easily passed muster under the establishment clause. See
SECTION 1981
employed a balancing test to weigh the Government's interest in pro-
hibiting discrimination against the burden that the withdrawal of tax
exempt status would place on Bob Jones University's religious
practice." In finding the Government's interest in eliminating all forms
of racial discrimination in education compelling, the court noted that the
Government must avoid any expression of support for racial discrimina-
tion in education.2 Furthermore, the first amendment will not exempt
religious practitioners from a law of general applicability grounded on a
compelling government interest.' Such an interest would include the
clear federal policy against racial discrimination whether governmental
or private, absolute or conditional, contractual or associational. 4 Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Government's compelling
interests in nondiscrimination outweighed the burdens on the school's
religious practice.85 Although Bob Jones involved the IRS's withdrawal
of tax exempt status88 from a racially discriminatory sectarian school
rather than a section 1981 right to contract, the first amendment issues
are the same. The Bob Jones decision implies that eventual resolution of
the section 1981 issue will favor the Government's interest in non-
discrimination.
The private sectarian school is one of the last bastions of segrega-
tion. The first amendment guards against requiring religions to keep in
step with expressed federal policy. The first amendment does not,
however, preclude government enforcement of the most fundamental
constitutional and societal values through neutral application of uniform
policies." The Supreme Court has held that government interest of suffi-
cient weight may justify some restraints on first amendment freedoms. 9
639 F.2d at 154-55. The Fourth Circuit noted that the neutrality principle of the establish-
ment clause does not prevent the government from enforcing the most fundamental con-
stitutional and societal values through neutrally applied, uniform policies. Id. at 154. Conse-
quently, the court found that minimum intrusion into the school's operation would serve im-
portant governmental interests. Id. at 154-55.
81 639 F.2d at 153.
Id As an example of the government's need to avoid supporting discrimination in
education, the Fourth Circuit noted its own previous denial of veterans' benefits to Bob
Jones University. Id.; see Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 608 (D.S.C. 1974),
affd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
639 F.2d at 153.
"I&
Id at 153-54. The Fourth Circuit noted that denial of tax exempt status would not
prevent the university from continuing to teach its beliefs or force a student to violate his
beliefs. Id-
See notes 79-80 supra.
639 F.2d at 154.
See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971); 639 F.2d at 154.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971); 639 F.2d at 154. Certain govern-
mental interests are sufficiently compelling to require conflicting religious practices to yield
in their favor. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld statutes prohibiting polygamy,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878), and sale of religious materials by
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The government must advance, however, a paramount interest of vital
importance. 0 The government's interest in enforcing the thirteenth
amendment's mandate against racial discrimination, through application
of section 1981 to racially discriminatory sectarian schools, is
compelling.91 Similarly, a sectarian school's discriminatory practices are
unlikely to be so essential to the school's continued existence as to
defeat the government's interest in eliminating discrimination. In the in-
terest of racial equality in education, courts facing a first amendment
defense to a section 1981 school segregation challenge are apt to enter-
tain heavy presumptions that governmental interests are paramount.
A. KIRKLAND MOLLOY
minors, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-70 (1944), as not violative of the first
amendment even though the actions effectively "favor" religions not engaging in such prac-
tices. Additionally, the Court has upheld Sunday closing laws in spite of the fact that the
state interest in providing a single uniform day of rest for all workers made the practice of
Orthodox Jewish merchants' beliefs more expensive. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
605-06 (1961); see text accompanying notes 53-62 supra.
" Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963).
91 See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
